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NOTE 
DISSECTING ELECTRONIC ARTS’ SPORE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE ILLICIT TRANSFER OF COPYRIGHT 
OWNERSHIP OF USER-GENERATED CONTENT IN 
COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
Andrew P. Connors† 
ABSTRACT 
This Note addresses the legality of a new kind of “shrink-wrap” End 
User License Agreement (EULA) contained within a computer software 
installation that purports to transfer copyright in works created with the 
software from the user of the software to the manufacturer of the software. 
This Note analyzes the enforceability of this type of contract in the context 
of Electronic Arts’ much-lauded computer game, Spore. Rather than a 
conventional game that relies on in-house graphic designers and animators 
for its content, Spore relies on the collective creativity of its millions of 
users to make most of the content in the game. By way of a built-in three-
dimensional modeler, users create advanced three-dimensional objects, 
including virtual organisms, buildings, vehicles, and spaceships, which are 
uploaded to a central server and distributed to all game users. Subsequently, 
the individual users download copies of these uploaded objects on their 
local machines automatically. Hence, the users interact with content created 
by other users, rather than the graphic designers and animators employed by 
the computer game manufacturer. Because case law supports the 
enforcement of this kind of “shrink-wrap” license, this unique EULA 
represents a novel threat to the intellectual property interests of authors of 
creative works. Hence, this Note argues that Congress should amend Title 
17, Chapter 2 of the United States Code in order to preclude the 
enforcement of this type of contract, to the extent that it misappropriates the 
legitimate intellectual property interests of authors of creative works and 
subverts the policy underlying federal copyright protection. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
An author has important, exclusive rights in his creative work.1 These 
rights, collectively known as “copyright,” provide an author with a 
monopoly2 on the work for a limited time.3 The government grants such 
rights because it recognizes that the provision of a unique reward to the 
author of a creative work ultimately benefits the public by encouraging the 
author to unleash his creative genius to the public.4 Copyright does not need 
to remain exclusively with the author; the author is free to transfer 
copyright ownership to a third party.5 However, as the government 
specially confers the right on the author, the author may only transfer his 
copyright ownership voluntarily.6 Otherwise, the author transfers copyright 
ownership not as a reward for unleashing his creative genius to the public, 
but as the result of an unwitting, involuntary transfer.7 This Note addresses 
such a transfer.  
This Note addresses the legality of a new kind of “shrink-wrap” End 
User License Agreement (EULA) contained within a computer software 
installation. The EULA purports to transfer copyright in creative works 
made with the software from the software user to the software 
manufacturer. Despite the apparent involuntary and extra-contractual nature 
of such an EULA, case law supports the enforcement of this kind of “terms 
later” license.8 Accordingly, this unique EULA represents a novel threat to 
the federally recognized copyright interests of authors in their creative 
works.9 Hence, this Note argues that Congress should amend Title 17, 
                                                                                                                           
 1. For instance, an author has the exclusive right to reproduce his work, to sell copies 
of his work to the public, and to display his work publicly, among other exclusive rights. See 
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 2. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 3. The time limit for the monopoly varies according to the status of the work. In the 
case of an independent author, the copyright will subsist for his lifetime plus seventy years. 
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 301–305 (2006). 
 4. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
 5. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (detailing copyright ownership and transfer 
thereof).  
 6. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. 
 7. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 8. See generally ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (setting forth 
the justification for the enforcement of a shrink-wrap license agreement). 
 9. The immediate transfer of copyright ownership in a creative work to a third party, 
other than a work made for hire, corrupts the underlying policy which seeks to expand the 
amount of creative works available to the public. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429. 
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Chapter 2 of the United States Code10 in order to preclude the enforcement 
of this type of contract, to the extent that it misappropriates the legitimate 
interests of authors and corrupts the underlying policy of federal copyright 
recognition. 
Part II of this Note addresses the legal and technical background 
surrounding the transfer of copyright ownership by way of an EULA and 
provides an overview of the constitutional foundations of copyright law, 
including the policy considerations underlying the right. This Part also 
examines the statutory provisions of copyright enacted by Congress under 
its Article I, Section 8 powers11 (collectively referred to as the “Copyright 
Act”).12 Part II pays particular attention to the protection of the computer 
graphics that are the subject of this Note, as well as the statutory provisions 
relevant to the transfer of copyright ownership. This Part follows with an 
examination of the contemporary legal rationale for the enforcement of 
shrink-wrap license agreements, as explained in the Seventh Circuit’s 
seminal decision in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.13 Part II concludes with an 
overview of Spore, the computer software that is the focus of this Note. 
Part III examines the application of copyright to the user-generated 
content in Spore. It first examines whether user-generated content in Spore 
is entitled to copyright protection. Concluding that the user-generated 
content satisfies federal copyright requirements, Part III then examines the 
enforceability of the shrink-wrap EULA in Spore. This Part pays particular 
attention to both the case law regarding such licenses and the requirements 
for transfer of copyright ownership under the Copyright Act.  
Given the apparent enforceability of the EULA under a ProCD regime, 
Part IV of this Note recommends that Congress should amend the 
Copyright Act in order to appropriately preclude the enforceability of this 
type of agreement. This action would maintain the legitimate interests of 
authors and software manufacturers by returning to the policy 
considerations underlying federal copyright protection. 
Part V concludes this Note. 
                                                                                                                           
 10. This chapter deals with copyright ownership and transfer. See generally 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 201–205 (2006). 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 12. For ease of use, the author will use the term “Copyright Act,” even though Congress 
has amended federal copyright law several times under numerous acts. 
 13. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
408 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:405 
 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. Legal Background 
As John Locke has suggested, an author’s right to the exclusive 
exploitation of his work exists partly because the author takes things 
available to all14 and applies his labor to those things to create something 
new.15 In view of that principle, the Founders endeavored to protect the 
intellectual property of authors in the U.S. Constitution, which empowers 
Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings.”16 As James Madison explained in The Federalist 
Papers, the right to a creation naturally belongs to its creator; according to 
Madison, Great Britain had already recognized this principle before the 
founding of America.17 Because the right was limited in duration under the 
proposed U.S. Constitution, Madison reflected that the public naturally 
benefited from the progress in artistic works encouraged by this intangible 
property right.18 As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, U.S. copyright 
law “is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors . . . by the 
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products 
of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”19 
Hence, the limited monopoly authorized by the federal Constitution and 
enabled by Congress seeks to benefit the public, rather than a private 
                                                                                                                           
 14. Things such as words, notes, colors, etc. 
 15. Although Locke did not write directly on intangible intellectual property rights, his 
writings support the moral underpinnings of both tangible and intangible property rights. As 
Locke explained: 
Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every 
man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but 
himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are 
properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath 
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it 
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him 
removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour 
something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this 
labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can 
have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as 
good, left in common for others. 
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 19 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hacket 
Publishing Co. 1980) (1690). 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).  
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party.20 However, the public can attain this benefit only if the government 
grants the reward of a limited monopoly to the author.21 This unique reward 
provides the incentive necessary to encourage private creative genius and 
for the private party to release that creative genius to the public.22  
A copyright immediately vests in the author of a copyrightable work 
upon creation of the work.23 To be copyrightable, the work must be (1) an 
original work of authorship, (2) fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression, and (3) capable of being perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated.24 Original works of authorship include “pictorial, graphic, 
and sculptural works,” among other works.25 The author of such a work has 
the exclusive right to reproduce the work and to display the work publicly, 
among other rights.26 In the case of an artistic image, the author of the work 
has the exclusive right to reproduce the image in any kind of article, not 
merely the kind of article in which the artistic image was originally 
embodied.27 
Because an author has a special relationship with his work,28 and since 
his copyright in the work is a potentially valuable monopoly,29 Congress 
has recognized that a transfer of copyright ownership30 from an author to a 
third party should not occur haphazardly.31 The author must intentionally 
transfer copyright ownership to a third party for a valid transfer to occur.32 
This explains why Congress imposed a writing requirement on the transfer 
of copyright ownership.33 In fact, Congress went even further by expressly 
forbidding the involuntary transfer of copyright ownership.34 However, 
                                                                                                                           
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006). 
 24. Id. § 102(a). 
 25. Id. § 102(a)(5). 
 26. Id. § 106. 
 27. Id. § 113(a). 
 28. In other words, an author, by inputting his labor into his work, creates something 
that is inextricably tied to him. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 29. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
 30. Copyright ownership not only includes outright transfers of copyright, but also 
includes exclusive licenses. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “transfer of copyright 
ownership”).  
 31. Alice Haemmerli, Take It, It’s Mine: Illicit Transfers of Copyright by Operation of 
Law, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011, 1011-13 (2006). 
 32. Id. 
 33. The copyright act includes a typical “statute of frauds” which requires a transfer of 
copyright ownership to be signed and in writing. See 17 U.S.C. § 204 (2006). 
 34. Id. § 201(e). 
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Congress created an exception to the writing requirement by allowing a 
transfer of copyright ownership to occur by “operation of law.”35 At least 
one court has held that the author must consent to a transfer of copyright 
ownership by operation of law, and hence this apparent exception to the 
requirement of a volitional transfer actually bolsters the requirement.36 
However, in an increasingly technological society, even an electronic 
writing conceivably satisfies the writing requirement,37 and a voluntary 
transfer could occur, at least in the eyes of the law, by way of a suspect 
shrink-wrap EULA contained within a computer software installation.38  
In the seminal case of ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enforced the provisions of a 
shrink-wrap EULA contained within a computer software installation, 
despite the fact that the software developer presented the EULA to the 
software user long after the user had purchased the software.39 Under 
traditional Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) analysis, the court should 
have confined itself to the original purchase of goods in order to determine 
the terms of the contract.40 In other words, under the conventional UCC 
analysis, a contract existed once the user exchanged money for software 
with a vendor at the point of sale.41 Flouting traditional contract law 
requiring a bargained-for exchange and mutual assent, the court enforced 
the “terms later” presented by the EULA at installation, even though the 
user did not agree to the terms during the initial transaction.42 The court 
reached its holding based on the novel theory that the user voluntarily 
agreed to the terms of the transaction because the user did not return the 
software after learning of the objectionable EULA, or the even more 
extraordinary theory that, had the user known about the EULA at the time 
of purchase, he would have theoretically agreed to it.43 Other courts have 
since followed the lead of ProCD and enforced the provisions of similarly 
                                                                                                                           
 35. Id. § 204(a). 
 36. Brooks v. Bates, 781 F. Supp. 202, 204-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 37. See, e.g., Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
7001–7006 (2006) (providing for the enforceability of a purely electronic contract). 
 38. For a thorough discussion, see Roger C. Bern, “Terms Later” Contracting: Bad 
Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook 
Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 641 (2004). 
 39. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 40. Bern, supra note 38, at 647-49. 
 41. Id. 
 42. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1448. 
 43. Bern, supra note 38, at 649-63. 
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suspect shrink-wrap license agreements.44 Accordingly, the prevalence of 
courts that are willing to enforce such seemingly involuntary agreements 
risk the enforcement of a similar agreement that transfers ownership of 
copyright, even though such enforcement would be contrary to the 
fundamental precepts of American copyright law.45 We now examine one 
such EULA.  
B. A Computer Game with a Suspect EULA 
Historically, computer game companies have employed large teams of 
graphic artists and animators to produce appropriate graphics and 
animations for their games.46 Under this traditional framework, computer 
game manufacturers own the copyrights to the particular graphics and 
animations contained within their games.47  
However, a new methodology of creating the intellectual property 
contained within computer games has arisen that brings ownership of 
copyright into question. Electronic Arts (EA), a leading publisher, 
developer, and distributor of computer games,48 has created a method to 
“procedurally generate” graphic animations.49 Instead of relying on 
animators to preconceive of ways to animate particular three-dimensional 
models (3D models), procedural generation creates animations on the fly.50 
                                                                                                                           
 44. See, e.g., Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Const. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 
1106-07 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (citing approvingly to ProCD in order to enforce a shrink-wrap 
EULA); SoftMan Prods. Co.v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1085 (C.D. Cal. 
2001) (citing to ProCD in order to enforce a shrink-wrap EULA); Brower v. Gateway 2000, 
Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (citing to ProCD to enforce the terms of 
a shrink-wrap agreement). 
 45. Congress forbids involuntary transfer of copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2006); 
Haemerlli, supra note 31, at 1011-13.  
 46. Steven Johnson, The Long Zoom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006 (Magazine), at 3, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/08/magazine/08games.html?_r=1 (last visited 
Nov. 18, 2008). 
 47. Copyright in a work for hire, such as game animations, vests in the corporation by 
statute, and likely by contract. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006).  
 48. Electronic Arts is the second largest computer game company based on market 
capitalization. ERTS: Industry: Multimedia & Graphics Software, 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/in?s=ERTS (follow “Multimedia & Graphics Software” 
hyperlink under Industry/Category heading) (last visited Nov. 7, 2009). 
 49. For example, procedural generation is able to determine how a modeled animal with 
long legs and hooves should behave. See Greg Kasavin, E3 06: Spore Creature Editor Hands 
On (May 10, 2006), http://www.gamespot.com/pc/strategy/spore/news.html?sid=6150118 
(last visited Sept. 13, 2008). 
 50. Id. 
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Hence, the computer game intelligently animates user-supplied 3D 
models.51 Using this technology, EA has created a computer game called 
Spore where the user creates much of the content in the game.52 
To much fanfare, EA released Spore, the first game built on the above-
described technology.53 In Spore, the game user guides a virtual organism 
through stages of life: from the primordial ooze, to sentience, to space, and 
beyond.54 Through this progression, the user “evolve[s]” his virtual 
organism by editing it with a powerful 3D modeling tool.55 The user utilizes 
a similar tool to create buildings, vehicles, and spaceships for his or her 
virtual organism’s “[c]ivilization” at progressing stages of the game.56 
Hence, the user does not passively interact with game objects that the 
computer game developer has placed in the game.57 Instead, the user creates 
those game objects by using a non-trivial tool similar to the tools that a 
graphic artist would use to design those same game objects.58 Through 
another technology known as “asynchronous sharing,” the local software 
uploads a user’s creations59 to a central server while it simultaneously 
downloads creations previously uploaded in this manner by other users.60 
Hence, in addition to his or her own creations, a user’s local game world is 
populated with the various creations of other game users.61 
In order to facilitate this creation-sharing and to provide for the sale of 
creation-related merchandise,62 the Spore EULA contains some suspect 
                                                                                                                           
 51. Id. 
 52. See generally Matt Vella, Spore: A Universe To Play In, BUSINESSWEEK.COM, Sept. 
8, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/content/sep2008/id2008095_995160.htm 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2008) (a mainstream review of Spore, a game using the above-
described technology that emphasizes the game’s strong reliance on user-generated content).  
 53. Id.  
 54. Marielle Messing, An Intelligently Designed Game, NEWSWEEK BLOG, Apr. 20, 
2008, http://www.blog.newsweek.com/blogs/current/archive/2008/04/20/your-intelligent-
design-here.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2008). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. 
 58. This is in contrast to the traditional game development framework. See supra note 
46 and accompanying text. 
 59. These creations include the user’s creature, buildings, vehicles, and spaceships. 
 60. See Marielle Messing, An Intelligently Designed Game, NEWSWEEK BLOG, Apr. 20, 
2008, http://www.blog.newsweek.com/blogs/current/archive/2008/04/20/your-intelligent-
design-here.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2008). Asynchronous sharing has also been dubbed 
“massively single-player online gam[ing].” See id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. EA sells merchandise t-shirts, mugs, and other articles on the “Official Spore Store.” 
The store is available at http://www.zazzle.com/sporestore (last visited Nov. 18, 2008). 
2010] DISSECTING ELECTRONIC ARTS’ SPORE 413 
 
 
language under the heading of “Intellectual Property Rights” and the 
subsection “Your Contributions,” stating: 
In exchange for use of the Software, and to the extent that your 
contributions through use of the Software give rise to any 
copyright interest, you hereby grant EA an exclusive, perpetual, 
irrevocable, fully transferable and sub-licensable worldwide 
right and license to use your contributions in any way and for 
any purpose in connection with the Software and related goods 
and services, including the rights to reproduce, copy, adapt, 
modify, perform, display, publish, broadcast, transmit, or 
otherwise communicate to the public by any means whether now 
known or unknown and distribute your contributions without any 
further notice or compensation to you of any kind for the whole 
duration of protection granted to intellectual property rights by 
applicable laws and international conventions.63 
Hence, the EULA purports to transfer the exclusive “bundle of rights”64 that 
ordinarily and properly belong to the author of a creative work to a third 
party that has merely provided the tools to create the work. The EULA 
requires the transfer despite the U.S. Constitution’s explicit requirement 
that the author receive these exclusive rights and despite the underlying 
public policy concerns of federal copyright law.65 Further, this suspect 
transfer of copyright ownership is not confined to one game. EA has 
expressed a willingness to produce more games using the above-described 
technology, and presumably under the same constricting licensing terms.66 
Accordingly, this Note examines the propriety of the EULA’s purported 
transfer of copyright ownership in further detail below. 
                                                                                                                           
Users can also create a comic book featuring their creations by visiting 
http://www.mashon.com/spore/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2009). Additionally, users can create 
figurines of their creatures at http://www.sporesculptor.com/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2009). 
 63. END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT (Spore DVD-ROM, rel. Sept. 7, 2008) (shown to 
the user at installation), available at http://www.ea.com/portal/pdf/legal/Spore_End_User_ 
License.pdf. 
 64. The “bundle of rights” includes the right to reproduce the work and publicly display 
the work, among other rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 65. See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.  
 66. See Brian D. Crecente, ‘Spore’ Is the New Video Game of Life, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
NEWS, Sept. 4, 2008, http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2008/sep/04/spore-is-the-
new-video-game-of-life/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2008). 
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III.  DISSECTING ELECTRONIC ARTS’ SPORE 
A. A User’s Copyright 
As the Spore EULA alludes to,67 a user’s creation may not meet 
copyright requirements. If this is the case, then the problematic nature of a 
transfer of ownership of the unique “bundle of rights” associated with the 
creation is moot, since no such rights exist. To be copyrightable, the 
creation must be: 
(1)  an original work of authorship,  
(2) fixed in any tangible medium of expression, and  
(3) capable of being perceived, reproduced, or otherwise  
 communicated.68   
Whether a user’s creation is “original” within the meaning of the Copyright 
Act depends on the nature of the work itself.69 Further, the extent that 
Spore’s 3D modeling tool allows for a reasonable amount of artistic 
creativity is also a consideration, since the user must provide the creative 
genius behind the work, rather than EA and its employees. If Spore’s 3D 
modeling tool lacks substantive depth, then the creation is nothing more 
than the outgrowth of EA’s creative genius, and hence the user has no 
copyright interest in the creation, as the creation is nothing more than one 
of a finite number of permutations of the game, all of which rightly belong 
to EA.70 Hence, this Part analyzes whether a user has a copyright interest in 
his Spore creation. This Part concludes that a user’s work can satisfy all 
three requirements of the Copyright Act, and is therefore copyrightable.71  
 1. Original Work of Authorship 
We start our analysis with originality, a cornerstone provision of the 
Copyright Act.72 Congress intentionally left “original work of authorship” 
                                                                                                                           
 67. The Spore EULA carefully does not suggest that a user has a copyright interest, 
explaining that a transfer of copyright ownership occurs “to the extent that [the user’s] 
contributions through use of the Software give rise to any copyright interest.” END USER 
LICENSE AGREEMENT, supra note 63, § 2.B.  
 68. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 69. That is, a work with no originality is not copyrightable. See supra Part II.A. 
 70. That is, the work is nothing more than a part of the original work that is the 
computer software. 
 71. A user that creates something that is not original, either because of the trivial nature 
of the work or because the work is a copy of a famous work, would not have a copyright 
interest in the work. See supra Part II.A. 
 72. H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664. 
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undefined, content to rely on the courts to define the term.73 Accordingly, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that “[o]riginal, as the term is used in 
copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the 
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at 
least some minimal degree of creativity.”74 As the Court further explained, 
“the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will 
suffice.”75 So long as the work possesses some creative spark, the work is 
original—no matter how humble, crude, or obvious the creative element 
might be.76 Original works of authorship include pictorial, graphical, and 
sculptural works,77 which include “two-dimensional and three-dimensional 
works of fine, graphic, and applied art, . . . models, and technical 
drawings.”78 Accordingly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit has acknowledged that three-dimensional digital models, like those 
created by Spore users, “can be employed to create vivid new expressions 
fully protectable in copyright.”79 
Spore includes several similar 3D modeling tools.80 The user interacts 
with these tools during various stages of the game.81 In the early stages of 
the game, the user plays as a single virtual organism (a “creature”), seeking 
food while avoiding predators.82 As the user acquires food, he gains “DNA 
points” that eventually allow the user to “evolve” his creature, or 
manipulate it with the 3D modeling tool.83 Eventually, a user’s creature 
establishes a civilization, at which point the user can create buildings with a 
similar 3D modeling tool.84 In the later stages of the game, the user enters 
space, at which point he creates a spaceship with another 3D modeling 
tool.85 Although all of these 3D modeling tools offer the potential for the 
                                                                                                                           
 73. Id. 
 74. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2006). 
 78. Id. § 101 (further defining “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,” among other 
terms).  
 79. Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1265 (10th Cir. 
2008). 
 80. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Messing, supra note 54. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
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creation of copyrightable works, this Note will use the creature-creator tool 
as an example.86   
A user’s creature could look something like this: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A Creature Made in Spore87 
 
In designing his creature, a user has the choice of a multitude of parts.88 The 
user may stretch and skew the parts, including the central body of the 
creature, as he sees fit.89 The user may place the parts in any position.90 The 
game does not confine the user to real-world conventions.91 Thus, the user 
may create one-eyed creatures, creatures with parts in odd places, creatures 
with three legs, and any number of other peculiar and creative 
configurations.92 As of this writing, EA’s centralized Spore server contains 
approximately 123,000,000 user creations, all varying in creative merit.93 
Ultimately, originality is subjective in nature, and a user’s creation may or 
may not satisfy the minimal level of creativity required by the U.S. 
                                                                                                                           
 86. Spore also includes a tool for outfitting creatures with interesting clothing, for 
creating music to associate with a creature, and for molding the creature as a less-complex 
organism in the “primordial ooze.” As these tools lack the complexity of the other tools in 
the game, they are not analyzed in this Note.  
 87. Flynn DeMarco, Spore Creature Creator (June 11, 2008), http://www.gamepro.com/ 
article/previews/191568/spores-creature-creator/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2008). 
 88. See Kasavin, supra note 49; Messing, supra note 54. To get a sense of the described 
functioning of the creature tool, the reader may also download a free, deprecated version of 
the Spore Creature Creator at http://www.spore.com/.  
 89. See Kasavin, supra note 49; Messing, supra note 54. 
 90. See Kasavin, supra note 49; Messing, supra note 54. 
 91. See Kasavin, supra note 49; Messing, supra note 54. 
 92. See Kasavin, supra note 49; Messing, supra note 54. 
 93. Spore Profile Page, http://www.spore.com/view/profile (statistics last checked Oct. 
2, 2009). Users can view others’ creations and relevant statistics; registration and login are 
required.  
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Supreme Court.94 Given the possibilities of the creature-creator tool, 
however, a user’s creation of a copyrightable work appears possible, and 
individual creations, like the one above, appear to have the minimal artistic 
merit required.95 
EA certainly seems to think so. When EA first shipped Spore, it needed 
to include some starter creations to populate local game worlds with 
content, since users had not yet had the chance to create the various 
creatures, buildings, vehicles, and spaceships that the game required to 
function properly.96 Accordingly, EA commissioned a graphic designer to 
create several creatures to populate the game world.97 Unlike game users, 
the designer retained a copyright interest in his creations and now collects 
royalties on merchandise sales.98 This suggests that EA acknowledges the 
artistic creativity in game creations, and hence the originality required to 
obtain a copyright to a work. This serves to bolster the notion that a user’s 
in-game creation potentially has the originality required for copyright 
protection.  
 2. Other Criteria 
The Copyright Act further requires that a copyrightable work be fixed in 
a tangible medium of expression and be capable of perception, 
communication, or publication.99 The Copyright Act provides for the 
satisfaction of these elements by “the aid of a machine or device.”100 
Accordingly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
held that an image stored on a computer’s hard disk is fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression.101 Similarly, this type of image is perceived, 
                                                                                                                           
 94. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.  
 95. See, e.g., Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 
1970) (holding that copyright subsisted in certain greeting cards even though the individual 
components of the greeting cards were not original; the particular alignment of these 
individual components was original); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 
104-05 (2d Cir. 1951) (holding copyright subsisted in certain mezzotint paintings, even 
though the paintings undergoing the mezzotint process were not the work of the producer of 
the paintings). 
 96. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
 97. Daily Mail Reporter, Engineer Becomes Successful Artist After Stroke Rewires His 
Brain, MAIL ONLINE, (Aug. 20, 2008), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-
1046768/Engineer-successful-artist-stroke-rewires-brain.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2008). 
 98. Id. 
 99. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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communicated, or published when it is displayed on a computer screen.102 
Since users can display the creatures on a computer monitor, and because 
they are fixed on a user’s hard drive or on EA’s central server, the 3D 
models created by Spore users satisfy the final copyright requirements. 
Since a user’s creation satisfies copyright requirements, under the 
Copyright Act, those rights initially vest in the user.103 
B. Enforcement of the Shrink-Wrap EULA 
If, however, the Spore EULA is valid, then the user’s copyright 
ownership immediately transfers from the user to EA.104 EA certainly has 
legitimate interests that warrant the provision of a license from the user to 
EA; for instance, EA must ensure that it maintains an appropriate 
intellectual property interest in user creations to facilitate the sharing of 
creations between the local game worlds.105 EA also markets various 
merchandise to users related to their creations, such as t-shirts, comic 
books, and figurines.106 EA, however, only requires a non-exclusive license 
to maintain these interests, since EA’s ability to carry out merchandising 
activities is not affected by the author concurrently exploiting his work as 
he sees fit.107 The exclusive license purportedly granted by the EULA to EA 
is just that—exclusive. If the user were to attempt to reproduce his work 
outside the confines of the game world, it would be entirely possible under 
this regime for EA to sue the user for copyright infringement.108 This begs 
the question: would a court enforce the transfer-of-copyright-ownership 
provision of this shrink-wrap EULA? This Part further analyzes this issue 
and concludes that a court that follows the ever-increasing trend set by 
                                                                                                                           
 102. Id. 
 103. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006). 
 104. See END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT, supra note 63, § 2.B.  
 105. Messing, supra note 54. 
 106. See supra note 62. 
 107. Apparently, the only reason that EA requires a monopoly on the use of Spore 
creations is so that it can preempt the sale of competing creation-related merchandise. See 
supra note 62 and accompanying text. It might even want to use Spore creations in other 
ventures, and exclude the use of those creations in potentially competing media, like movies. 
For instance, Twentieth Century Fox recently announced that it will partner with EA to 
make a Spore movie. Spore To Evolve into Major Motion Picture, 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-17938_105-10370036-1.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
 108. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2006) (allowing a copyright owner, which includes an 
exclusive licensee, to bring an infringement suit against any unauthorized infringer, even the 
original author). Such an infringement suit entails other registration requirements outside of 
the scope of this Note.  
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ProCD would enforce this provision, notwithstanding the Copyright Act’s 
requirement that a transfer of copyright ownership be voluntary. 
 1. Voluntary Transfer of Copyright Ownership 
Congress sought to ensure that transfers of copyright ownership were 
“unequivocally intentional” when it amended the Copyright Act in 1976.109 
Accordingly, Congress amended the Copyright Act to require the transfer 
of copyright ownership to occur by a signed writing,110 although it excluded 
transfers “by operation of law” from this requirement.111 Despite this 
exception, Congress expressly forbids the involuntary transfer of copyright 
ownership in the Copyright Act.112 At least one court has recognized that 
“operation of law” cannot transfer copyright ownership without the express 
or implied consent of the copyright owner.113 Hence, all of the ways that an 
author of a creative work can transfer copyright ownership require the 
knowledge and consent of the author.  
The fact that Congress intended to require an author of a creative work to 
knowingly and voluntarily transfer his copyright ownership is further 
strengthened by the writing requirement of the Copyright Act. The 
Copyright Act requires an author of a creative work to transfer copyright 
ownership in the work by way of a signed writing, notwithstanding those 
transfers executed by operation of law.114 Courts encountering this issue 
traditionally juxtapose the writing requirement with an impermissible oral 
agreement transferring copyright ownership.115 Hence, courts interpret this 
portion of the Copyright Act to preclude an oral transfer of copyright 
ownership,116 but not necessarily an electronic writing. This is because of 
the policy considerations underlying the writing requirement of the 
Copyright Act.117 The writing requirement “prevents misunderstandings by 
spelling out the terms of a deal in black and white, forces parties to clarify 
their thinking and consider problems that could potentially arise, and 
encourages them to take their promises seriously because it’s harder to 
backtrack on a written contract than on an oral one.”118 An electronic 
                                                                                                                           
 109. Haemmerli, supra note 31, at 1011-12. 
 110. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2006). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. § 201(e). 
 113. Brooks v. Bates, 781 F. Supp. 202, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 114. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). 
 115. See, e.g., Effects Assoc., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 556-57 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 557. 
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document achieves these same ends. This further suggests that Congress 
had no concern for precluding electronic writings, but only oral agreements. 
Additionally, a recent federal statute allows for the enforcement of 
contracts executed entirely in electronic form.119 Under the Electronic 
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (“E-SIGN Act”), “a 
signature, contract, or other record relating to [an interstate commerce 
transaction] may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely 
because it is in electronic form.”120 The E-SIGN Act expressly states that it 
does not “limit, alter, or otherwise affect any requirement imposed by a 
statute, regulation, or rule of law relating to the rights and obligations of 
persons under such statute, regulation, or rule of law other than a 
requirement that contracts or other records be written, signed, or in 
nonelectronic form.”121 Accordingly, the E-SIGN Act further suggests that 
a transfer of copyright ownership may occur by way of an electronic 
writing with an electronic signature. This leaves us with one final question: 
can a third party receive copyright ownership from an author who transfers 
that interest by way of the instant EULA, since the author does so with 
knowledge and consent in some sense, but fails to voluntarily transfer the 
ownership interest in the purest sense of that term? 
 2. An Enforceable Agreement Under ProCD 
A court that follows ProCD jurisprudence would likely enforce the 
instant EULA, since ProCD suggests that shrink-wrap EULAs are actually 
voluntary contracts, despite their after-the-fact nature.122 In ProCD, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enforced an EULA 
contained within a computer software installation, even though the 
purchaser of the software could not know of the license terms when he 
purchased the software at the point of sale.123  
Under the conventional wisdom of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC), a user’s purchase of software at the retail point of sale constitutes 
an acceptance of the retailer’s offer to sell the software by placing the 
software on the store shelf, instantly forming a contract.124 Under this 
reasoning, the later presentation of a license agreement either constitutes a 
confirmation of the contract, or it constitutes a modification of the contract, 
                                                                                                                           
 119. See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
7001–7006 (2006). 
 120. Id. § 7001(a)(1).  
 121. Id. § 7001(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 122. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. 
 123. ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 124. Bern, supra note 38, at 647. 
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enforcement of each of which the UCC precludes under sections 2-207 and 
2-209, respectively.125 
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the transaction included 
additional terms at the point of sale, because the software box included a 
disclaimer, which, in small print, indicated that use of the software was 
conditioned on an enclosed EULA.126 The court viewed the inclusion of this 
condition as “reasonable,” since it was unreasonable to expect the software 
developer to attach the entire EULA to the box.127 The court further viewed 
the condition fair in light of the fact that if the software purchaser did not 
agree to the terms of the EULA, the purchaser could return the software for 
a refund.128 The court finally assured itself of the voluntary nature of the 
contract by suggesting that the economic efficiency of the transaction 
implied that the purchaser accepted the inherent cost of this kind of 
purchase.129 The court did recognize, however, that a shrink-wrap license is 
not enforceable if it is unconscionable or violates a rule of positive law.130 
Since it is usually difficult to demonstrate unconscionability,131 a positive 
law exception serves as the only realistic possibility for preserving the 
copyright interests of authors of creative works under the Spore EULA. 
Hence, the positive law exception of an involuntary transfer of copyright 
ownership may serve to defeat the enforceability of the Spore EULA and 
preserve the user’s copyright interest in his creative work. 
However, a Spore user appears to voluntarily accept an offer qualified by 
a shrink-wrap EULA in the same way that the user accepted the additional 
conditions of the shrink-wrap EULA in ProCD. The Spore box includes a 
statement indicating that the user must agree to an included license 
agreement in order to play the game, just like the user in ProCD.132 At 
installation, the Spore user agrees to the EULA and has the option to return 
the software, just like the user in ProCD.133 The Spore user also separately 
agrees to an EULA when he creates an online account in order to facilitate 
                                                                                                                           
 125. See id. at 648. 
 126. Id. at 650. 
 127. Id. at 651. 
 128. Id. at 653. 
 129. See ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450, 1451-52 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(explaining the inherent costs associated with common transactions with terms unknown to 
the purchaser at the time of purchase). 
 130. Id. at 1450. 
 131. See, e.g., Dumais v. Am. Golf Co., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1191-92 (D.N.M. 2001). 
 132. SPORE (DVD-ROM, rel. Sept. 7, 2008). The reader can find the notice on the back 
of the box.  
 133. Id. 
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the sharing process integral to the game.134 This goes beyond the facts of 
ProCD. Hence, under the ProCD regime, Spore users appear to be bound 
by the EULA, and this seems to comply with the positive law requirement 
of the Copyright Act that a user voluntarily transfer ownership of his 
copyright, at least as that term is understood under ProCD and under 
federal copyright law.135 
IV.  CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE COPYRIGHT ACT 
Although the Spore EULA appears to satisfy the requirement of a 
voluntary transaction under federal copyright law and the ProCD regime, 
the special nature of a transfer of copyright ownership still casts a shroud 
over the transaction. Given the rather daunting language presented by the 
EULA and the rigorous legal knowledge required to appreciate its 
implications, a typical user likely lacks the sophistication to appreciate the 
rights given up by the user when agreeing to the requirements of the 
EULA.136 While failure to know the terms of a contract does not ordinarily 
excuse a person from the terms of a contract,137 the special nature of the 
transfer of copyright ownership heightens the status of the transaction.138 
Therefore, although the user appears to voluntarily accept the EULA under 
a strict understanding of the law, deference to the special protection 
afforded to authors of creative works along with the underlying policy 
considerations of federal copyright law warrants additional federal statutory 
protections for the rights of authors in their creative works.139   
Rather than vest ownership of a copyright in an artistic work, the EULA, 
as enforced, vests ownership in a third party that provides the tool used to 
create the work.140 Under a traditional understanding of copyright, a 
paintbrush salesman could not claim copyright over those things created by 
customers with his paintbrushes.141 To put it in modern terms, Microsoft 
                                                                                                                           
 134. Id. 
 135. See supra Part II.B. 
 136. See supra Part II.B and note 60. 
 137. See, e.g., Stawski v. Stawski, 43 A.D.3d 776, 778 (N.Y. 2007) (“One need not be an 
attorney or a Fulbright scholar to know the folly of signing a legal document without an 
understanding of its import.”). 
 138. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. 
 139. Id.; see supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra note 63. 
 141. See generally Part II.A (explaining that the provider of the tool does not receive 
copyright protection, but rather the author that, through his creative spark, creates something 
new).  
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could not claim that it owned the rights to something created with Word.142 
While American copyright law requires the author to reap the rewards of 
his creative genius, the EULA turns the tables and actually deprives the 
author of the ability to reap the rewards of his work.143 The exclusive 
license purportedly granted by the EULA is just that—exclusive. If the 
author were to attempt to produce his work outside the confines of the game 
world, it would be entirely possible under this regime for the game 
manufacturer to sue the author for copyright infringement.144 Instead of 
providing an incentive to spur creative genius of authors as required under 
the Federal Constitution and federal copyright law, the Spore EULA 
prevents the creator from reaping the incentive and instead confers the 
reward on a third party that is not responsible for the creative genius behind 
the work.145 Without the incentive provided by federal law, the public 
suffers, as it ultimately benefits from the reward initially conferred on 
authors.146 Accordingly, Congress should amend Title 17, Chapter 2 of the 
United States Code in order to preclude the enforcement of shrink-wrap 
EULAs that purport to transfer copyright ownership of works created by 
users of the software to the software manufacturer to the extent that such a 
license misappropriates an author’s legitimate copyright interest in his 
creative work.   
While EA certainly has a legitimate interest in protecting the integrity of 
its software and seeking reasonable profits from the sale of related 
merchandise, EA does not require a perpetual, exclusive license to promote 
this interest. Hence, Congress should amend the Copyright Act to provide 
that the transfer of copyright ownership may not occur by way of an EULA 
whose terms are not fully disclosed to a user at the point of sale prior to 
purchase. Since transfer of copyright ownership does not include non-
exclusive licenses,147 amending the Copyright Act in this way would 
appropriately protect the interests of game manufacturers wishing to utilize 
the unique potential for profits presented by the technology underlying 
Spore. More importantly, such an amendment would adequately preserve 
the interests of authors in their copyrighted works, consistent with the 
                                                                                                                           
 142. Cf. Part II.A. 
 143. See supra note 108. 
 144. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2006) (providing that a copyright owner, which includes an 
exclusive licensee, may bring an infringement suit against any unauthorized infringer, even 
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rationale underlying copyright protection provided by the U.S. 
Constitution.148 
By returning the unique reward of a limited monopoly to the author of a 
creative work, the type of amendment proposed by this Note would provide 
an appropriate incentive for an author to release his work to the public and 
exploit it accordingly.149 Without such an amendment, while typical users 
of Spore and like software programs will no doubt produce many creations 
within the confines of the game world, a well-informed user that seeks to 
exploit his creative work outside the game world will have a disincentive to 
do so, since he will risk an infringement suit. Hence, the current regime 
potentially deprives the public of the creative genius of the author, instead 
confining the genius to the whims of the game manufacturer. Further, the 
author is left with no monetary reward if the manufacturer exploits his work 
beyond the limited realm of the digital images and merchandise related to 
the game. Accordingly, Congress should amend the Copyright Act to 
correct these warped incentives and return to the proper scheme of private 
and public benefits mandated by the Federal Constitution and federal 
copyright law.150 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Federal copyright recognition exists to reward the creativity of authors, 
not third parties that happen to provide the tools of the trade to those 
authors. After all, the limited commodity that the law seeks to increase is 
creativity and the product of that creativity. As a constitutional matter, this 
policy exists to benefit the public, not the author. As a moral matter, an 
author shares a special bond with his creative work. For these reasons, 
Congress has recognized that an author cannot involuntarily transfer 
ownership of his copyright to a third party. Yet, this is precisely what EA 
has attempted to do by including the peculiar terms in Spore’s EULA that 
govern user-generated content. When taken with the decision of the court in 
ProCD, the shrink-wrap EULA included with Spore poses a unique threat 
to the traditional framework governing transfer of copyright ownership. 
Accordingly, Congress should amend Title 17, Chapter 2 of the United 
States Code to properly preclude the enforcement of this shrink-wrap 
agreement, and thereby preserve the fundamental policy underlying 
copyright law. 
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